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Caution : If you wish to use or quote the material on these pages when preparing coursework, be careful to acknowledge your sources fully by citing the website address. Click on one of the following to access the relevant section : Click here to return to top of page
These following sections provide a general overview of the key concepts and central issues that have formed the substantive analyses within the course Work, Industry and Society (WIS). These notes were written before the preparation of D. Knights and H. Willmott, Management Lives, Sage 1999. You are advised to refer to this book for elaboration of the points made here.
You may be more or less aware of how three major conceptual elements have comprised the theoretical framework for analysing work, industry and society. Insofar as these have not always been direct topics of either lectures or seminars we felt it appropriate to summarise the course in terms of them. The concepts are identity (and insecurity), power and inequality. In our view, the ideas expressed in our use of these concepts offer a means of making sense of the complexity of social relations without involving excessive simplification, on the one hand, or student disorientation because of obscure and esoteric language, on the other. There is, however, a price to pay in using terms that are frequently drawn upon in everyday life since it is rare that the commonsense (defined as conclusions based on inadequate, insufficient or unexamined data) use of language captures the quality and complexity of that to which it refers. The term commonsense is routinely understood to mean the practical application of intelligence. But, upon reflection, we find that it is comprised of a set of unreflected prejudices and `half-baked' principles. In certain circumstances - for example, time is of the essence, if you are approached by a stranger on a dark street in New York (or Rusholme) late at night - the unreflected prejudices may be superior to deep reflections upon human nature, poverty or the conditions of racial discrimination. Similarly if your car runs out of petrol there is not much point in taking the internal combustion engine to pieces to find out what is wrong. These situations demand no more than an immediate, speedy and practical response, providing a `short-cut' solution to the problem on hand. To labour with some abstract theory in such circumstances is not only irrelevant but also probably dangerous. The application of theory to inappropriate circumstances is what results in the pejorative label, `merely academic' with the implication that such has no practical value. Two things need to be remembered though. First, commonsense is not atheoretical so much as based on very crude and taken-for-granted theoretical assumptions such as violence and energy in the examples above. Second, that wherever one finds an undermining of someone or something else (e.g. `merely academic' or `unreflected commonsense') you can almost guarantee that an alternative identity is being elevated (e.g. the `practical man or woman' or `the intellectual'). Neither commonsense nor intellectual discourse is independent of the exercise of power to support a specific identity and invariably a claim for resources that generates inequality. Acknowledging this as a background, we continue this summary of WIS by seeking to challenge and deepen commonsense preconceptions and prejudices without relying too heavily upon jargon or straying too far from common usage.
In the first part of the course we drew continuous attention to the importance of our distinctive self-consciousness in producing and understanding, responding to and transforming the social and natural world. Although we can never be entirely sure as to whether other animals (e.g. dolphins) share our `freedom' to attribute to ourselves and others a socially constructed identity, only if the circus roles were completely reversed would it be clear that the uniqueness of human beings was directly challenged. Clearly, we identify ourselves and are identified by others. An individual identity, thereby, is not natural but social: it is a medium as well as an outcome of human history and, in this sense, always changing despite our best endeavours to render it stable and secure. Our actions are mediated by this knowledge of ourselves. We are social, historical beings, not only `natural' beings. Virtually every human process, even physiological ones, are mediated through our social relations with others. This simple observation has the most profound consequences for understanding almost every aspect of human life because the peculiar self-conscious, freedom/reflexivity of human beings is a source of great opportunities for self- and social development but also for self- and social destruction. The big issues of world politics (e.g. the threat of a nuclear holocaust, energy crises, ecological disasters, third world poverty, aids, etc.) reflect this tension between the positive and negative potential of human existence. At an individual level our self-conscious freedom can be used positively to expand meaningful relationships but it also is prone to self-negation where insecurity and defensiveness renders us impotent to relate meaningfully to anything except our own neuroses. Although the attribution of freedom to human nature may be seen as a pre-scientific, metaphysical assumption (1), it is clear that individual freedom, and the responsibilities associated with it, is a `social fact' created by modern civilizations as a condition of citizenship. In this context, the freedom of the individual becomes not just a condition and consequence of self-consciousness but also an ideological weapon of legitimation of an historically particular, liberal-democratic capitalist regime. Regardless of the domination of multi-national oligopolies or the differential capacities of individuals to purchase goods (market freedom) caused by massive inequalities of wealth, the ideology of individual freedom is elevated to a position of great sanctity in contemporary capitalism. But all modern societies, including the most totalitarian, are founded upon an attribution of individual freedom and, more importantly, personal responsibility. Only minors, the mentally ill and, to a partial extent, prisoners are absolved from this historical fact of human existence - which is merely another, less contentious way of saying that `normal' human beings are free. This `knowledge' exerts some powerful effects. If, as individuals, we are responsible not only for what we become (i.e. our own identity and behaviour) but also for others insofar as our actions always affect the actions of those with whom we interact, then human freedom imposes a very considerable burden - experienced as insecurity, anxiety and guilt - from which it is difficult to resist the desire to escape (2) . In seeking to escape this burden of freedom, individuals are highly vulnerable to mechanisms of power such as hierarchical and other judgments (e.g. examinations) which separate out the successful from the unsuccessful, the competent from the incompetent in ways that direct us towards some attempt to secure a position which is defined as being in the former rather than the latter set of categories. There are numerous ways of becoming successful and competent but, by definition, a large minority if not majority must fail. Many find the competition and struggle too much and respond to the burden of freedom by subordinating themselves (i.e. their identities) almost entirely to the expectations of a significant other (e.g. butler, deferential worker, henpecked husband, `groupie'). An alternative response to failure is to seek to protect oneself from the reality of a lack of success and the indignity of subordination through mentally distancing oneself from, or acting indifferently towards, the situations of everyday life pretending that we have an inner identity, a private self through which we `really' live our lives. To a large degree, the latter is something of an illusion (albeit perhaps important for maintaining one's sanity in the face of the degradation of material and symbolic poverty) since even the most recluse of hermits cannot ultimately escape the expectations and judgments of others. This is because judgment is an implicit if not explicit feature of all human relations, social practices and institutions. Try yourself to think of an occasion when you were not judging or evaluating yourself or others and/or not being judged by them? Indeed it is an attempt to escape from being judged that leads people to either seek to dominate or subordinate themselves to others. Domination and subordination, however, provide us with some of the most horrific historical examples of human terror and destruction. To date, Fascist Germany is the worst of these examples though similar processes were present in Stalinist Russia and other totalitarian regimes in the Third World (e.g. Haiti under Papa Doc and Iran under the Ayatollah). Psychologically, the attraction of subordinating self so completely to other is that it offers the simplest way of gaining confirmation of one's social existence and thereby avoiding the anxiety and insecurity of isolation. However, an uncritical and unselfconscious investment of identity in institutions and routines is not confined to totalitarian regimes! For example, it also provides a strong motivation for individuals to invest themselves in established and socially legitimised institutions and routines - for example, in the institution of marriage. But, equally, security may be sought in conspicuous, fashionable forms of counter-conformity (most evident in youth culture) where identity is founded upon the negation of conformists as `straights', `sheep', `proles', etc. Notes1. It could be argued that most attributions of freedom are rooted in a metaphysical belief but some are more sophisticated than others. So, for example, behaviourism refuses to explore the `mind' but remains convinced that individuals can always choose between pleasant and painful stimuli on the basis of their past experience of these. Underlying the theory is a crude and unquestioned metaphysics of freedom. Symbolic interactionism and phenomenology are more sophisticated in identifying freedom as residing in self-consciousness and the ability for the human being to see itself both as a subject and an object of its own activities. 2. This burden of freedom was an explicit assumption
behind most existentialist writings either in the form of philosophy (Sartre:
Being and Nothingness), theology (Kierkegaard: Either/Or), social
philosophy (Fromm: The Fear of Freedom) or novels (Sartre:
Nausea, The Roads to Freedom, Camus: The Outsiders) and many others. Click here to return to top of page
The concept of power is employed to reveal how knowledge of the world is very often drawn upon in the exercise of power since it not only provides a basis for action but also frequently ensures that such action will be acknowledged as valid or rational because it is grounded in knowledge. But, in exercising power, more knowledge is produced - such as knowledge of the effects of its application. It is this which leads us to say that knowledge is both a medium and outcome of relations of power as a relation, for example, between employers and employees or between men and women. This does not mean that power operates exclusively in one direction; employees often use their practical knowledge of production to exercise power over employers (e.g. output restrictions). However, the use of power in this way by employees usually reinforces their subordination and may have even worse consequences (e.g. redundancy of workers as in the Slavs case study). In the end it is the control of material and symbolic resources for which there is a universal demand that results in the exercise of power having an hierarchical character. In contemporary society the exercise of power also has a patriarchal character. A limited reflection reveals how language itself expresses and institutionalises patriarchal relations of power: for example, instead of using the term `humanity', we routinely refer to `mankind' or `man'. In using language to describe the world, we actually reflect or reinforce, construct or reconstruct that world - in this case, a world which is male-centric and provides differential resources and privileges for the sexes. The emergence, strength and influence of the feminist movement is itself indicative of the presence of patriarchal relations of power in modern society. Moreover, despite legislation in the form of the Sex Discrimination Act and the Equal Pay Act providing some support, feminists have secured only small gains in eroding male domination. What most men do not recognise, however is that their domination is also oppressive to themselves. Very often men are unable to relate to themselves and others except in a 'cold' and rational manner. Given that all human beings are emotional as well as rational, this over-emphasis upon rationality is impoverishing of the 'richness' of human experience. In our view, power should not be seen as a thing which is possessed by individuals, groups or classes as is conventional in the literature nor is it necessarily negative and constraining. Instead, we conceive of power as a relation in which the actions of some people have an effect upon the actions of others. The possession of material resources or access to specific knowledge (see section on inequality) may facilitate the exercise of power, but only if those whom power is exercised over are tempted by the material rewards offered or have considerable respect for the knowledge surrounding the exercise of power. As can be seen from the section on identity, power and freedom go hand in hand in contemporary society. That is to say, power involves social actions which, often unconsciously, direct the freedom of others towards practices that develop their abilities to exercise power. The best example which is of immediate relevance to students is the examination. This institution consists of a set of social practices that direct, or exercise power over, students to use their freedom to read, revise, memorise, question spot, and possibly develop their intellect, etc. in the belief/expectation that they will advance their freedom and their abilities to exercise power as a result. In a majority of cases this expectation is fulfilled. While the power of the examination may seem to you at present a negative constraint on your freedom to pursue more pleasurable activities, it can also be seen as a positive and productive transformation of you as individual students into subjects who have been defined as competent to train for the exercise of power and successful enough to command higher salaries than non-graduates. In this sense, the examination enhances your power and freedom so cannot presumably be seen as wholly negative. Click here to return to top of page The third concept is introduced to underscore the importance of differences in possession of, and access to, valued material and symbolic goods (e.g. wealth and expertise) for understanding the organisation of work, industry and society. In the absence of a reflection upon structured inequalities, there is a danger of understanding what happens at the lower end of work hierarchies, for example, as an expression of the irrationality, ignorance or incompetence of particular individuals or groups. Instead it is possible to appreciate how their behaviour is conditioned by structured social inequalities in respect of material and symbolic goods. In turn, this stimulates reflection upon the economic and political principles which underpin the reproduction of inequality in work, industry and society. The value of this is that the behaviour of individuals can then be understood socially and historically - as reflecting an articulation of the wider context which is, in turn, reproduced through their actions. Organisations whether of a national or international character reflect as well as reproduce inequalities, for example of gender, class and race, that are a part of the broader society. Rarely does one find an organization, for example, in which women, blacks (1) and the children of manual workers are represented in the higher echelons of an organization in equal proportions to their membership as a whole or to general population distributions of these categories of people. Of course, even if they were, this would not indicate the absence of inequality but merely the presence of equal opportunity or the eradication of sex, class and racial discrimination. In these circumstances, inequality might secure a greater degree of social legitimacy since it would be more closely founded on the values of merit for which there is an almost universal acceptance or consent within western cultures. Notes1. We are aware that while the term `black' seemed quite acceptable a decade ago, recently there is objection to such an all encompassing category and, for example, the more complex nomenclature `Asian, black and other minority ethnic' is advocated (Cole, 1993: 672). For reasons of brevity, however, in this text we continue to use the less politically correct term. Click here to return to top of page
Although it is often helpful, at an introductory level, to represent complex phenomena in terms of distinct levels or sub-units of analysis, the problem with disaggregation (i.e. breaking things up into their constituent parts) is that the 'gestalt' of the whole is frequently more than the sum of its parts. That is to say, the relational character of the parts in complex interactions and interdependencies has a tendency to change their character so that to study them separately involves a gross distortion that cannot be corrected merely by adding the distinct bits of analysis together afterwards (1). There is, however, a communication problem with holistic (e.g. interdisciplinary) forms of analysis. A refusal to restrict analysis to a narrow aspect or level of human affairs is often associated with the criticism that it is `woolly', abstract and insubstantial. While many of the social sciences (e.g. economics, psychology, politics, sociology) sacrifice the complexity and completeness of social reality in order to achieve precise and quantitative measures of an abstracted element, WIS represents an attempt to move in the opposite direction of respecting the complex, contradictory and meaningful quality of social reality. In this sense, the course is not so much about focusing intensely upon a particular set of human practices (e.g. marketing, company accounts, personnel practices) and more about a different way of seeing each of these in relation to how we continuously manage our selves and are managed through the institutions and routines of contemporary society. From our point of view, it is important that the various social sciences be treated (critically and reflexively) as a topic of analysis as well as resource for the (positive) improvement our own understanding (this point is developed in the section covering the Knowledge Problem). For example, we have drawn attention to the way in which psychology and economics, for example, exercise power over human subjects when they reduce them to a statistical representation of their cognitive powers, personality, attitudes or consumption preferences. Not only does such representation violate the complexity of persons; it also generates `knowledge' or `expertise' that is used to control them. Not that any knowledge, the themes of WIS included, is ever free of the power relations which are its conditions and consequence. Nonetheless, within this irremediable constraint, WIS does attempt to promote insight and understanding that has a potential to subvert conventional power-knowledge relations insofar as it exposes their `game' and demystifies their `expertise'. In this regard, it could be seen as sharing some of the ideals of Margaret Thatcher who has frequently argued that she wants to give power and responsibility back to the individual. Of course, her method of doing this, through the strengthening of the principles of a `free market', frequently has the opposite effect in that it tends to disorganise populations, increase inequality and polarise society around material wealth. Another element in the neo-conservative creed is that `society does not exist; only individuals and families' A flippant response to this claim is the question : how can Mrs. Thatcher make sense of her title and job as Prime Minister (of State) without reference to more than individuals and families? Does she, perhaps, see herself as the Mega-Nanny of the British Family? However, there may be a sense in which her denial of the existence of society is not as absurd as it first sounds. For society certainly does not exist in the same way as do individuals. Its complexity precludes or militates against a simple definition which clearly creates difficulties for those of us who attempt to capture its meaning and significance for everyday living (and plays into the hands of those who dismiss it as woolly, abstract or insubstantial). All that can be said is that society, comprising the myriad of institutional (i.e. regulated by legal or other formal rules) relations and social (i.e. ordered around norms or informal rules) practices is the medium and outcome of the actions and interactions of individuals, groups and corporate bodies. It is almost impossible to say precisely what society is as opposed to discussing how it works through conditioning or structuring, as well as being produced by, the thoughts and actions of its subjects. It is for these reasons that we have to reflect deeply on the presence and changing nature of institutions - economic, cultural, political - in the lives of us all. For it is through our participation in the reproduction of these institutions that we are able to constitute and organise our lives as individuals and in families. To argue against this is to suggest that individuals have a responsibility only to themselves and to their families - and not for the wider institutional framework (i.e. `society') without which individuals and families as we know them would not exist. But, equally, it is necessary to appreciate that the reproduction of the institutional framework is not accomplished independently of the actions of individuals. In WIS, then, that overused distinction that economics and other social sciences often draw between analyses of the large scale `macro' reality and the more detailed examination of a `micro' situation in, say, an individual firm is questioned and abandoned on the grounds that it falsifies how human beings live their lives. Just as every individual is in society as a whole so `society' is also in every individual; that is, in the way in which they make sense of reality or attribute meaning to their lives. It is this mutual interpenetration of parts and wholes that leads us to criticise analyses which continually treat the part as separate, as in micro-economics, individual psychology and organisational sociology, as guilty of `dualism' whereby the whole economy or society can only be added on mechanically and in an ad-hoc fashion after the research has been conducted. An alternative is to view parts and wholes as interpenetrating conditions and consequences of one another (i.e. as a duality) as we have been doing throughout this summary. For similar reasons, as has also already been intimated, we are critical of the compartmentalisation of academic disciplines in which the `psychological', the `sociological', the `economic', the `political', etc. are split off from one another. To repeat, this separation may be helpful at an introductory stage : each discipline does have something to contribute to the larger project of social science. But problems arise as each discipline represents the whole through a perspective which is constructed with minimal or highly selective reference to other disciplines. For reasons which, for us, are associated above all with issues of inequality, power and identity, material and ideological barriers of professionalisation currently impede the multi- and inter-disciplinary development of social science. Social science has become something of a Tower of Babel in which those trained within the different disciplines have developed very different ways of making sense of the world and, as a consequence experience considerable difficulty in communicating with one another. In a small way, this course is an attempt to cross some of the boundaries and break through some of those barriers. From the social sciences, we explore concerns central to psychology (e.g. consciousness, identity), sociology (e.g. class, gender), economics (e.g. labour and product markets) and politics (e.g. power, the state). In doing so, we have sought to indicate their relevance for understanding strategic and operational management as well as the `staff' functions of personnel, marketing, data processing, accounting, etc. 1. Not only this but it is virtually impossible to study one aspect of human life without making all sorts of assumptions about the other. In economics, psychology or sociology, for example, these assumptions are often very crude having a character not unlike those of the commonsense preconceptions and prejudices which social science is predisposed to criticise. Click here to return to top of page
It is necessary to recognise that the meaning of words is defined by the social context of their use. Everyday terms, like identity and power, are being used to convey ideas which are not fully communicated in their everyday commonsense usage. This is because, in their everyday usage, these terms are employed to express an opinion or confirm a piece of received wisdom whereas, in their intellectual usage, they are employed to reflect upon features of the everyday world which are routinely taken-for-granted. Of course, there is no sharp separation between these forms of knowledge precisely because critical reflection depends upon the language of commonsense understanding; and commonsense understanding selectively appropriates the insights generated through critical reason. Indeed, it is our view that an important purpose of social science, like that of the arts, is to enrich and deepen commonsense understanding upon which all human endeavour depends. This brings us to a more direct consideration of the issue which provides an introduction to the course : the status and significance of our knowledge of the world. Starting the course with a reflection upon knowledge may seem bizarre, even irrelevant. But this itself should give cause for reflection. For is it not much stranger that, in a scientific age and in an academic institution, the nature of knowledge is so routinely taken-for-granted? By rendering knowledge problematic, it is possible to recognise how it is fundamental to our sense of `the real world' and, of course, of ourselves as participants in the reproduction and transformation of this world. What is `real' about the world changes with our knowledge of it. Moreover, what distinguishes `science' from other ways of knowing about the world is a commitment to reflect critically and systematically upon existing forms of knowledge - whether concerned with the natural or social world. This, of course, begs the question about what counts as `critical and systematic', and there are numerous philosophies of science which strive to provide an authoritative answer to this question. The difficulty with most of their answers is that they represent science as a method rather than a practice. And, in doing so, they fail to embed science within the social institutions which are the conditions of its possibility - in much the same way that those who equate racism with the prejudice of individuals fail to set it in its wider context. If science is treated as a social practice, then it can be seen as a medium and outcome of identity, power and inequality. Identity is relevant insofar as scientists are constrained by a concern to confirm their reputation as scientists within their community. Mechanisms of power, constituted and reproduced within this community, serve to define what is, and what is not, acceptable as science. Scientists are as much prone to stigmatising alternative approaches (e.g. `quack' doctors, mystics) to secure their identity as are whites in relation to blacks, and `normals' in relation to `deviants'. It has to be recognised as an exercise of power. But the pursuit of science is itself guided and constrained by the process of funding which, in broad terms, reflects the priorities of its sponsors : business or the state. Insofar as inequalities exist in the organisation of business and/or of the state, these inequalities tend to be reproduced in the funding of science. Recent controversy over the funding of basic food and health research, of vital importance to all members of society, has served to highlight this tendency in that the food manufacturers and distributors have a vested interest in preventing it and can do so through their control of resources. Without pursuing any further the politics of science, two contrasting approaches to the production and interpretation of knowledge can be identified. First, a `positive' approach presents and understands knowledge as if it were objective and factual. Here there is little or no concern to reflect upon how the `facts' are produced or interpreted as `facts'. This is typical of conventional textbook approaches to the dissemination and learning of knowledge in which memorising information and techniques is elevated much beyond its importance. This can be contrasted with a critical approach which presents and understands knowledge as negotiated and provisional. Negotiated in the sense that it is the product of reflection and always subject to the variety of interpretations which may be placed upon it. Provisional because it is self-conscious about its reliance upon particular assumptions which can always be questioned. So, in contrast to `positive' knowledge in which the problematical grounds of knowing are ignored or concealed, the critical approach seeks to expose the relativity of the social conditions (material and cultural) which support its claims to truth. Despite their differences, these approaches to presenting and interpreting knowledge are interdependent. On the one hand, the communication of the `critical` approach is necessarily `positive'. For, in order to say anything, it is necessary to suspend doubt in the assumptions which underpin what is being said, even though greater efforts may be made to expose these assumptions so that others may read them `critically'. On the other hand, the knowledge presented in the `positive' approach is itself the product of critical reasoning, though this is obscured in a `positive' presentation/presentation. This approach can be seen as an historical residue of critical reason which has stopped reflecting critically upon its claims to truth. It is possible that, in part, any perception that WIS is different from many other courses reflects its espousal of a critical approach to the dissemination of knowledge. Instead of presenting packages of `positive' knowledge to be memorised and regurgitated, WIS is intended to encourage critical reflection. It seeks to develop a different way of relating to knowledge which is alive and self-critical rather than the accumulation of dead information which is filed away and quickly forgotten. We do not favour an understanding of knowledge as a possession or commodity, like a piece of property. Knowledge is always conditional and problematical; it is never final or complete. It only appears to be certain and finite when the exercise of power precludes or prevents reflection which problematises its claims(1) . While such closure is an insult to the student's intelligence, the institution of the exam renders many students willing to accept the insult in the belief that success in exams simply require the regurgitation of fixed sets of carefully memorised facts. The paradox and tragedy of such beliefs is that, even in the most positivistically conceived courses, an imaginative reconstruction of what has been learned is likely to `pay' greater dividends in terms of differentiating the `better' from the `average' exam performance (2) Notes1. Clearly, it is not difficult to silence discussion of the problematical foundations of knowledge. The formal lecture, based upon a textbook, is the institution par excellence through which this power is exercised. Needless to say, it is much less demanding and troublesome for the (identity of the) teacher if s/he can be spared the `indignities' of having to defend his/her ideas and approach to teaching to students. 2. It is an irony of the orthodox teaching process that this special ingredient is the product of that spark of intelligence which is specially valued and nurtured by a critical approach to, and examination of, `fixed' ideas, facts and knowledge. Needless to say, similar qualities differentiate the `high flyers' who have the edge in identifying the key problems and spotting the opportunities. For they are the ones who have developed a way of seeing which differentiates them within the labour market. For those who embrace the spirit of this course, we would expect it to enhance performance in other courses and, more importantly, advance your capacity to deal more effectively with the practical problems of everyday work and non-work life. Click here to return to top of page
We have stressed the importance of interpreting the actions of individuals and groups in relation to an appreciation of the wider institutional contexts (and vice-versa). We have also emphasised the importance of developing an interdisciplinary perspective on social life in general and management, in particular. For these reasons, each of the key concepts of the course - identity, power and inequality - should be understood in relation to the insights generated by each other. An understanding of the reality illuminated/constructed by these concepts (e.g. inequality), for example, is superficial (and potentially misleading) without reference to the dimensions of social reality exposed by the other concepts. Click here to return to top of page This site was constructed by Hugh Willmott and was last updated on 03/10/00
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